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Introduction
With policy interest rates near zero and a weak economy, ‡exible in ‡ation targeting, as practiced by major central banks, has come under intense public scrutiny and criticism. A conceptually appealing alternative, some argue, would be to adopt nominal GDP level targeting. In this case, the central bank would have to make up for any past deviations of nominal GDP from the target.
In particular, when nominal GDP falls below target, the central bank has to compensate for the shortfall in economic activity by credibly promising further policy stimulus. Such forward policy guidance on the level of nominal GDP provides a way to stimulate the economy when policy is constrained by the zero lower bound (ZLB) on nominal interest rates. Thus, according to the relevant literature, nominal GDP level targeting is clearly a superior framework for monetary policy compared to in ‡ation targeting.
In this article, however, I argue that ‡exible in ‡ation targeting can be improved signi…cantly.
I compare in ‡ation targeting to nominal GDP level targeting in a small New Keynesian model subject to the ZLB constraint. First, I study the performance of optimal discretionary policies. I …nd that, for a standard calibration of the model to U.S. data, in ‡ation targeting under discretion leaves the economy open to a de ‡ationary trap. Nominal GDP level targeting under discretion, by contrast, provides a …rm nominal anchor to the economy. Second, I study simple policy rules and the role of smoothing in the rules. Such forward guidance on the policy interest rate provides stimulus to the economy. With smoothing, a Taylor-type rule performs as well as a nominal GDP level rule. These result suggest that in ‡ation targeting should not be ditched. Still, it can be improved signi…cantly, by using policy rate smoothing to anchor in ‡ation …rmly.
In the New Keynesian literature, the case for nominal GDP level targeting has recently been stressed by Woodford (2012) . In fact, nominal GDP level targeting closely resembles the ideal policy in the small New Keynesian model, as studied in Woodford (2010) . The desirability of a nominal level target when the ZLB becomes a binding constraint was stressed by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and Svensson (2003) , well before the …nancial crisis and great recession. More 2 recently in the aftermath of the crisis, Billi (2011) and Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Wieland (2012) study the optimal rate of in ‡ation and the ZLB in the New Keynesian model. The literature, however, does not argue that policy rate smoothing is as e¤ective as a nominal level target in providing a …rm nominal anchor to the economy, as argued instead in this article.
Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 presents the policy evaluation. And Section 4 concludes. The Appendix contains technical details.
The model
I use a small New Keynesian model as described in Woodford (2010) , but with a nominal GDP level target hardwired into the central bank's objective function. I also introduce the target in a class of simple policy rules studied by Taylor and Williams (2010) . In addition, I take into account that the nominal policy rate occasionally hits the ZLB. In such a setting, I explain how to account for the steady-state costs of in ‡ation in the policy evaluation. After describing the salient features of an equilibrium that accounts for the ZLB and uncertainty about the evolution of the economy, I calibrate the model to U.S. data.
Private sector
The behavior of the private sector is summarized by two log-linearized, structural equations, namely an Euler equation and a Phillips curve, respectively describing the demand and supply side of the economy. The equations of this basic model are linearized around zero in ‡ation.
The Euler equation, which describes the representative household's expenditure decisions, is given by
where E t denotes the expectations operator conditional on information available at time t. x t denotes the measure of real economic activity or the real GDP gap, i.e., the deviation of real GDP from its ‡exible-price steady state. t is the in ‡ation rate, i.e., the change in the log-price level ( t = p t p t 1 ). i t 0 denotes the short-term nominal interest rate (as well as the instrument of monetary policy, as discussed in the next subsection). And r n t is a natural rate of interest shock. 1 ' > 0 is the real-rate elasticity of the real GDP gap, i.e., the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of household expenditure.
The Phillips curve, which describes the optimal price-setting behavior of …rms, under staggered price changes à la Calvo, is given by
where u t is a mark-up shock, resulting from variation over time in the degree of monopolistic competition between …rms. 2 (0; 1) denotes the discount factor of the representative household.
The slope parameter,
is a function of the structure of the economy, where ! > 0 denotes the elasticity of a …rm's real marginal cost with respect to its own output level. > 1 is the price elasticity of demand substitution among di¤erentiated goods produced by …rms in monopolistic competition. Each period, a share 2 (0; 1) of randomly picked …rms cannot adjust their prices, while the remaining
(1 ) …rms get to choose prices optimally.
In addition, the exogenous shocks are assumed to follow AR(1) stochastic processes, 1 The shock r n t summarizes all shocks that under ‡exible prices generate variation in the real interest rate. It captures the combined e¤ects of taste shocks, productivity shocks, and exogenous changes in government expenditures. 4 r n t = (1 r ) r ss + r r n t 1 + "r " rt
with …rst-order autocorrelation parameters j 2 ( 1; 1) for j = r; u. The steady-state real interest rate r ss is equal to 1= 1, such that r ss 2 (0; +1). And "j " jt are the innovations that bu¤et the economy, which are independent across time and cross-sectionally, and normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviations "j > 0 for j = r; u.
Monetary policy
In this basic model, I consider a range of monetary policy frameworks, with nominal policy rates constrained by the ZLB. After describing a typical benchmark policy, I introduce a nominal GDP level target in optimal discretionary policies and in simple policy rules.
Ramsey plan
As a benchmark in the policy evaluation, I use the optimal Ramsey plan, i.e., the optimal commitment policy determined at time zero. The policymaker's objective function in this case is the social welfare function:
where denotes the weight assigned to stabilizing real GDP relative to in ‡ation. This objective function, as explained by Woodford (2010) , can be derived as a second-order approximation of the lifetime utility function of the representative household. The utility function is validly approximated around zero in ‡ation. The approximation of the utility function allows to determine in terms of the structure of the model economy. Thus, is equal to = in this model.
Optimal discretionary policies
Under optimal discretion, the policymaker does not commit to the Ramsey plan and instead re-optimizes in each period, as described in Woodford (2010) . I focus on two monetary policy frameworks in such a setting. First, with in ‡ation targeting under discretion, the policymaker's objective function takes the form: the economy reverts to a stable equilibrium rather than to an unstable path. But in that paper I did not consider the anchoring e¤ect of a nominal GDP level target.
As a second framework for monetary policy under discretion, I consider nominal GDP level targeting. The policymaker's objective function becomes:
where y t denotes the nominal GDP gap, which is equal to p t + x t . y t denotes the corresponding target, which is assumed to increase at a deterministic rate p t + x . And p t is the corresponding 2 Phillips curve (2) implies x = (1 )
price level target which increases at rate , such that p t = p t 1 + . Raising serves as prevention against a de ‡ationary spiral. But the scope for prevention is limited, because of the anchoring e¤ect of the nominal GDP level target.
Simple policy rules
In addition to the optimal policies, I focus on two simple policy rules along the lines of Taylor and Williams (2010) . The …rst is a version of the Taylor rule subject to the ZLB constraint:
The second is a nominal GDP level rule with ZLB constraint:
In the rules, i denotes the equilibrium nominal policy rate, which is equal to r ss + .
The rules incorporate forward policy guidance, or smoothing in the behavior of the interest rate, through a positive value of the coe¢ cient i . But as argued, for example, by Taylor and Williams (2010) and Giannoni (2012) , values of i above 1 would imply unusual behavior by the central bank. i u t 1 denotes the preferred setting of the policy rate in the previous period that would occur absent the ZLB. Thus, the policy rate is kept below its equilibrium value following an episode when the ZLB is a binding constraint on policy. This approach implies that the rules compensate for the lost monetary stimulus due to the existence of the ZLB.
Measuring welfare
Next, I need a criterion to evaluate the monetary policy frameworks. As argued in Woodford (2009), objective function (3) is the right criterion because it includes the costs of steady-state 7 in ‡ation. To clarify, the welfare loss associated with in ‡ation in period t includes two parts:
On the right side, the …rst term is the welfare loss due to steady-state in ‡ation, and the second term is the loss due to in ‡ation variability. Both parts are relevant for a correct policy evaluation in this model in the presence of the ZLB. Neglecting, in particular, the …rst term would imply that welfare is strictly increasing in , because raising limits the incidence of hitting the ZLB. This is the case, for example, in Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Wieland (2012) when they linearize the model around zero in ‡ation. 
Equilibrium
In equilibrium, the policymaker chooses a policy based on a response function y (s t ) and a state vector s t . The corresponding expectations function takes the form:
where f ( ) is a probability density function of the future innovations that bu¤et the economy.
Because there is uncertainty about the future state of the economy, the ZLB is an occasionallybinding constraint among the endogenous variables in the model.
In such a setting, I provide the following equilibrium de…nition:
De…nition 1 (SREE) A stochastic, rational-expectations equilibrium is given by a response function and corresponding expectations function, y (s t ) and E t y t+1 (s t ), respectively, which satisfy the equilibrium conditions, derived in Appendix A.1.
Ignoring the existence of uncertainty about the evolution of the economy, the model could 3 In fact, in their …gure 2A, the dash line is strictly increasing.
8 be solved with standard linear-quadratic methods. 4 By contrast, I must use a global numerical procedure to …nd an equilibrium that accounts for the ZLB and a stochastic process like the one studied here. See Billi (2011) for a description of my numerical procedure. When the ZLB threatens, the mere possibility of hitting the ZLB causes expectations of a future decline in GDP below potential and in ‡ation below its target, as we showed in Adam and Billi (2006, 2007) . But in those papers we did not study nominal GDP targeting or smoothing in simple policy rules.
Calibration
Before turning to the policy evaluation, I calibrate the model to U.S. data with the parameter values shown in table 1. Speci…cally, I use the parameter values in Giannoni (2012) but assume a more persistent real-rate shock as in previous research on the ZLB. Overall, therefore, the calibration is very similar to the one I used in Billi (2011) if price indexation is set to zero.
[ Table 1 about here]
Policy evaluation
Employing the small New Keynesian model with a standard calibration to U.S. data, I evaluate the optimal policies and simple policy rules. In the evaluation, I take into account that the nominal policy rate occasionally hits the ZLB. After illustrating the anchoring e¤ect of a nominal GDP level target, I show that policy rate smoothing also anchors in ‡ation …rmly.
Optimal policies
The starting point for the evaluation is the performance of the optimal policies. I show that under optimal discretion the economy can fall into a de ‡ationary trap, in which the representative household su¤ers an in…nite welfare loss. There are ways, however, to reduce the risk of in ‡ation becoming unanchored.
One way is to raise the in ‡ation target above a critical value. To illustrate, …gure 1 shows the welfare loss, measured as the permanent consumption loss relative to the Ramsey plan, as a function of the in ‡ation target. 5 In the top panel, the critical value of the in ‡ation target is between 1.6 percent annual (strict in ‡ation targeting) and 1.8 percent annual ( ‡exible in ‡ation targeting). The ‡exible in ‡ation targeter is assumed to assign an optimal weight to stabilizing real GDP relative to in ‡ation. 6 At the critical value of the in ‡ation target, the welfare loss relative to the Ramsey plan is minimized or, conversely, welfare is maximized for the representative household in the economy. The intuition for why the critical value is slightly lower with strict in ‡ation targeting is straightforward. If in ‡ation targeting is strict, in ‡ation is less variable and therefore more tightly anchored to the target. As a result, the economy is less prone to a de ‡ationary spiral. On the other hand, by focusing entirely on stabilizing in ‡ation, real GDP is more variable than would otherwise be the case. With strict in ‡ation targeting, the welfare loss at the critical value amounts to 0.85 percent of permanent consumption, but declines to 0.79 percent of permanent consumption in the case of ‡exible in ‡ation targeting. Thus, on balance, ‡exible in ‡ation targeting is preferable in terms of welfare to strict in ‡ation targeting.
[ Figure During a ZLB episode, in particular, nominal GDP level targeting allows in ‡ation to temporarily rise above its target. This bout of in ‡ation implies a speedier economic recovery than would otherwise be the case. The reason is that the surge in prices encourages …rms to expand production. The ability to jump start the economic recovery and push in ‡ation above target are salient features of the Ramsey plan. However, the in ‡ation targeter under discretion lacks the resolve to push in ‡ation above target. To illustrate, …gure 2 shows the expected evolution of the model economy after a -2 standard deviation real-rate shock. 7 Shown are the expected paths under the optimal discretionary policies, with optimal in ‡ation targets that minimize the welfare loss relative to the Ramsey plan. Also shown is the expected path in the case of the Ramsey plan.
With the Ramsey plan, the nominal policy rate is gradually raised back to its equilibrium level during the economic recovery (top panel). This prolonged monetary stimulus causes real GDP to rise above potential (middle panel) and in ‡ation to rise above its target (bottom panel). Also in the case of nominal GDP level targeting, prolonged monetary stimulus pushes in ‡ation above target, albeit to a lesser extent than in the Ramsey plan. But with ‡exible in ‡ation targeting, in ‡ation does not rise above its target during the economic recovery.
[ Figure 2 about here]
Nominal GDP level targeting is, therefore, more e¤ective at stabilizing the economy than in ‡ation targeting. Table 2 shows the performance of the discretionary policies, with optimal in ‡ation targets that minimize the welfare loss relative to the Ramsey plan. The table reports the expected frequency and duration of ZLB episodes. It also reports the welfare loss relative to the Ramsey plan. With the Ramsey plan, the nominal policy rate is expected to hit the ZLB about 13 percent of the time. But the incidence of hitting the ZLB edges down to 12 percent with nominal GDP level targeting and to 10 percent with ‡exible in ‡ation targeting. 8 The lower incidence of hitting the ZLB is associated with higher in ‡ation targets and, of course, higher costs of steady-state in ‡ation. With ‡exible in ‡ation targeting, the welfare loss due to steady-state in ‡ation is 0.2 percent of permanent consumption. In addition, the welfare loss due to in ‡ation variability is 0.49 percent of permanent consumption. And the welfare loss due to real GDP variability is 0.1 percent of permanent consumption. In sum, with ‡exible in ‡ation targeting, the total welfare loss relative to the Ramsey plan is 0.79 percent of permanent consumption. By contrast, with nominal GDP level targeting, the total welfare loss amounts to only 0.08 percent of permanent consumption. Thus, in the case of optimal discretion, nominal GDP level targeting performs clearly better than in ‡ation targeting.
[ Table 2 about here]
Simple policy rules
As the next step in the evaluation, I study the performance of the simple policy rules. I show that the de ‡ationary trap is a problem not only under discretionary policies but also under simple policy rules. But a solution to the trap is to incorporate policy rate smoothing in the rules.
To study the role of smoothing in the rules, I search numerically for the optimal rule coe¢ -cients and in ‡ation targets that minimize the welfare loss relative to the Ramsey plan. Figure   3 shows the welfare loss, measured as the permanent consumption loss relative to the Ramsey plan, as a function of the rule coe¢ cients. In each panel a single rule coe¢ cient is changed, while the other rule coe¢ cients and the in ‡ation target are at their optimal values that minimize the welfare loss. 9 Thus, each panel illustrates the marginal e¤ect of a single rule coe¢ cient on the welfare of the representative household in this model economy.
[ Figure 3 about here]
As the top-left panel shows, the smoothing coe¢ cient in the Taylor In this model, the optimal rule coe¢ cients are in practice equal to 1. As the various panels in …gure 3 show, raising each of the rule coe¢ cients towards 1 leads to a decline in the welfare loss or, in other terms, a welfare improvement for the representative household in the economy. But the higher the rule coe¢ cients, the smaller the welfare improvement. This occurs because with a strong policy response, the welfare loss as a function of the rule coe¢ cients becomes practically ‡at. As a result, raising the rule coe¢ cients above 1 (not shown in the …gure) would not lead to a noticeable, further improvement in welfare for the representative household in the economy.
Next, I illustrate the anchoring e¤ect of policy rate smoothing. To do so, …gure 4 shows the welfare loss, measured as the permanent consumption loss relative to the Ramsey plan, as a function of the in ‡ation target. If the rule is labeled as optimal coe¢ cients, the rule coe¢ cients are set to 1. But if the rule is labeled as suboptimal smoothing, the smoothing coe¢ cient is lowered to 0.7, while the other rule coe¢ cients and the in ‡ation target are at their optimal values that minimize the welfare loss relative to the Ramsey plan. As the top panel shows, the critical value of the in ‡ation target is 1.3 percent annual in the case of the Taylor rule with suboptimal smoothing. At the critical value of the in ‡ation target, the welfare loss is minimized and therefore welfare is maximized for the representative household in the economy. As the bottom panel shows, by contrast, the Taylor rule with optimal coe¢ cients is associated with well-anchored in ‡ation in the economy. Because of optimal smoothing in the Taylor rule, the optimal in ‡ation target that minimizes the welfare loss is now zero. In addition, the nominal GDP level rule, either with optimal coe¢ cients or with suboptimal smoothing, is also associated with well-anchored in ‡ation. These results, thus, suggest a role for smoothing in the Taylor rule to provides a …rm nominal anchor to the economy.
[ Figure 4 about here]
Optimal smoothing in the rules makes in ‡ation temporarily rise above target during a ZLB episode. This surge in in ‡ation promotes a more rapid economic recovery than can be achieved with suboptimal smoothing in the rules. To illustrate, …gure 5 shows the expected evolution of the model economy after a -2 standard deviation real-rate shock. Shown are the expected paths under the simple policy rules, with optimal in ‡ation targets that minimize the welfare 14 loss relative to the Ramsey plan. With optimal coe¢ cients in the rules, real GDP rises above potential and in ‡ation rises above target during the economic recovery (solid lines in the various panels). However, the surge in in ‡ation is modest, as the in ‡ation gap only rises to about 0.3 percent annual in the case of the Taylor rule and to about 0.2 percent annual in the case of the nominal GDP rule. But with suboptimal smoothing the shape of the economic recovery is quite di¤erent (dash-dot lines in the various panels). In particular, because of the limited amount of monetary stimulus, in ‡ation does not rise noticeably above target during the economic recovery.
[ Figure 5 about here]
With optimal smoothing, therefore, the Taylor rule is as e¤ective as the nominal GDP rule in stabilizing the economy. Table 3 shows the performance of the simple policy rules, with optimal in ‡ation targets that minimize the welfare loss relative to the Ramsey plan. The table reports in the top panel the performance of the rules with optimal coe¢ cients and in the bottom panel the performance of the rules with suboptimal smoothing. Comparing the two panels, optimal smoothing in the rules is associated with a lower in ‡ation target and therefore a higher incidence of hitting the ZLB. It is also associated with a lower welfare loss. As the top panel shows, with optimal smoothing, the total welfare loss in the case of the Taylor rule is only 0.02 percent of permanent consumption, which is only 0.01 percent higher than in the case of the nominal GDP rule. The results suggest that with optimal smoothing, therefore, the Taylor rule in practice performs as well as the nominal GDP rule.
[ Table 3 about here]
Conclusion
In this article, I shed light on recent proposals directed at major central banks to abandon in ‡ation targeting and instead adopt nominal GDP level targeting. To do so, I evaluate optimal policies and simple policy rules in a small New Keynesian model subject to the ZLB constraint. 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions of this problem are
In ‡ation targeting under discretion. The Lagrangian of problem (1), (2) and (4) is
and fy (s t+j )g given for j 1:
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
Nominal GDP targeting under discretion. To solve for a stationary equilibrium, I use the price level in deviation from its trend
Using this identity, the Lagrangian of problem (1), (2), (5) and (14) can be written as
A summary of the equilibrium conditions is provided in the following (1), (2) and (8)- (10) (u t ; r n t ; m 1t 1 ; m 2t 1 )
In ‡ation targeting (discretion)
(1), (2) and (11)- (13) (u t ; r n t )
Nominal GDP targeting (discretion)
(1), (2) and (14)- (18) (u t ; r n t ;p t 1 )
Taylor rule
(1), (2) and (6) u t ; r Nominal GDP rule
(1), (2), (7) and (14) u t ; r 
A.2 Permanent consumption loss
I obtain the permanent consumption loss as in Billi (2011) . The expected lifetime utility of the representative household is validly approximated by
where C is steady-state consumption; U c > 0 is steady-state marginal utility of consumption;
and L 0 is the value of objective function (3).
At the same time, a steady-state consumption loss of 0 causes a utility loss
Equating the right sides of (19) and (20) gives Optimal coe¢ cients Taylor Notes: Shown is the expected path after a -2 standard deviation real-rate shock, with optimal in ‡ation targets. The ‡exible in ‡ation targeter assigns optimal weight to the stabilization of real GDP relative to in ‡ation. Notes: Shown is the expected path after a -2 standard deviation real-rate shock, with optimal in ‡ation targets. The optimal rule coe¢ cients are equal to 1. But if suboptimal smoothing then i is lowered to 0.7.
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